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Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank: Plain 
Language and the Implied Private Right of 
Action Under Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 
For nearly three decades, most federal courts implied a 
private right of action against aiders and abettors of securities 
fraud under section 1qb) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934' and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 
lob-5.' However, applying a plain language analysis, the Su- 
preme Court recently held in Central Bank v. First Interstate 
Bank3 that this private right of action does not exist, because 
section 10(b) does not expressly mention aiding and abetting. 
This decision creates an analytical inconsistency, since the 
Court continues to recognize a private right of action against 
primary section 1qb) violators even though a private right is 
not express in the statute. Furthermore, the Court's decision is 
contradicted by lower court precedent, legislative intent, and 
policy, all of which support a private right of action against aid- 
ers and abettors. 
This Note argues that the Court's plain language approach, 
though appropriate in other contexts: is too restrictive for 
interpreting a civil statute created to  provide a broad remedial 
scheme. In particular, when applied to  section 10(b), the ap- 
proach frustrates the statute's intended purpose and if taken to 
its logical conclusion would further disarm investors of a potent 
antifraud weapon-the implied section 10(b) private right of 
action. Central Bank demonstrates the unsuitability of the 
Court's approach in interpreting section 10(b).~ 
Part I1 of this Note briefly discusses the securities acts, 
section 10(b), Rule lob-5, and the interpretive case law that 
followed. Part I11 outlines the facts in Central Bank and the 
Supreme Court's plain language reasoning. Part IV analyzes 
1. 15 U.S.C. Q 78j(b) (1988). 
2. 17 C.F.R. Q 240.1013-5 (1994). 
3. 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994). 
4. See infra note 103. 
5. It has been suggested elsewhere that Central Bank may have the positive 
effect of causing a realignment of federal powers. See The Supreme Court, 1993 
Term-Leading Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 139, 370-71 (1994). 
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this reasoning in light of statutory precedent, congressional 
intent, and policy. Part V examines the potential effects of Cen- 
tral Bank on the defrauded investor, public section 1qb) en- 
forcement, and the implied private right of action for primary 
violations of section 10(b). Part VI concludes that the Court's 
plain language approach stifles the broad remedial purpose of 
section 10(b), and that the Court's ruling in Central Bank is 
analytically inconsistent with implying a private right of ac- 
tion, but that the implied private right for primary violations of 
section 1qb) is probably secure. 
A. Securities Fraud Legislation 
The early 1930s marked the beginning of dramatic political 
and fiscal change for a nation weary of economic disaster. With 
the effects of the 1929 stock market crash still lingering, leg- 
islators passed two landmark ena~tments.~ The first of these 
acts, the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act),? requires, inter alia, 
full disclosure of material information regarding first-time 
public offeringss and their registration with the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC).g Congress' intent was to deter fraud-a 
major contributor to  the 1929 crashlo-and to  promote fair 
dealing. l1 
The second enactment, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(1934 Act),12 is more "omnibus," affecting all aspects of public 
securities trading.13 It was enacted "to provide for the regula- 
6. At times, this Note will refer to these enactments together as the "securi- 
ties ads." For a general discussion of the securities ads, see Milton H. Cohen, 
"Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340, 1340-66 (1966). 
7. 15 U.S.C. $$ 77a-77aa (1988). 
8. 15 U.S.C. $ 77j (1988); see a h  H.R. REP. NO. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1- 
5 (1933). 
9. 15 U.S.C. $ 77e (1988); see also THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SE- 
CURITIES REGULATION $ 1.2, at 7 (2d ed. 1990). The Securities Exchange Ad of 
1934 recognized the Securities and Exchange Commission instead of the FTC as 
the administrative and enforcement body for securities regulation. See i+ note 
13. 
10. See HAZEN, supra note 9, $ 1.2, at 7. 
11. See H.R. REP. NO. 85, at 1-5. 
12. 15 U.S.C. $5 77a-7811 (1988). 
13. See HAZEN, supra note 9, $ 1.2, at 7-8. For example, the 1934 Ad re- 
quires companies who list their stock on national securities exchanges to report 
material information to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 15 U.S.C. 
8 78m (1988). See generally HAZEN, supra note 9, $ 1.2, at 8. 
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tion of securities exchanges and of over-the-counter mar- 
kets . . . , to prevent inequitable and unfair practices on such 
exchanges and markets, and for other  purpose^."'^ In essence, 
Congress wanted to bar all manipulative and deceptive conduct 
in the securities arena. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act empowers 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to establish 
rules to meet this objective.15 
I t  shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, 
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate com- 
merce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securi- 
ties exchange- 
. . . .  
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security registered on a national securities ex- 
change or any security not so registered, any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules 
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as neces- 
sary or appropriate. in the public interest or for the protection 
of investors. l6 
In 1942, under the auspices of section 10(b), the SEC 
adopted what Professor Thomas Lee Hazen has characterized 
as "its most encompassing antifraud prohibition7' in Rule 
10b5:17 
The SEC was established because Congress felt the FTC would not be able to 
handle the new administrative and enforcement burdens being proposed in the 
1934 Act. As a result, all reporting is now made to the SEC. Id. at 7-8. 
14. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 728 (1975) (in- 
ternal quotation marks omitted). "Section 1003) of the [I9341 Act was designed as a 
'catchall' anti-fraud provision to enable the [SEC] to handle novel and unforeseen 
types of securities fraud," and was intended to "operat[e] even when more specific 
laws have no application . . . ." Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities 
Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 122, 124 (1993) [hereinafter Se- 
curities Hearings] (Prepared Statement of Mark J. Griffm, Securities Division, De- 
partment of Commerce, Salt Lake City, UT). 
15. See 15 U.S.C. $ 78jb); HAZEN, supra note 9, 8 12.1, at  609; see also 
B r e ~ a n  v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147, 155 (7th Cir. 1969), 
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970). 
A basic philosophy of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is disclosure 
and is directed toward the creation and maintenance of a post-issuance 
securities market that is free from fraudulent practices. The investor's 
protection is the paramount consideration of much of the federal securities 
legislation and, in particular, of the 1934 Ad here involved. 
Id. 
16. 15 U.S.C. 8 78j (1988). 
17. WEN, supra note 9, 8 13.2, a t  669. Rule lob-5 is so identified "because 
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I t  shall be unlawfbl for any person, directly or indirectly, 
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate com- 
merce, . . . 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to 
omit t o  state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon 
any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any securi- 
ty.18 
That the SEC intended Rule lob-5 to deter fraudulent acts is 
clear from the plain language of the rule; however, neither 
section 10(b) nor Rule lob-5 expressly creates a civil remedy.lg 
Furthermore, as Hazen observes, "[Nlot much can be gleaned 
from the history of [Rule lob-5,] although the courts frequently 
refer to the legislative history behind the statute?' Neverthe- 
less, statutory precedent and some historical fragments provide 
insight into congressional reasoning and intent regarding sec- 
tion 10(b). 
it was the fifth rule" promulgated under 8 lo@). WLLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. 
COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION A D FINANCE 155 (5th ed. 1993). It is the 
result of an impetuous SEC move to prohibit insiders from using their non-public 
knowledge for their personal gain in the securities arena. The SEC heard of a 
corporate president who, knowing that the corporation would soon receive a valu- 
able contract, personally visited shareholders and offered to repurchase their 
shares. The SEC immediately adopted Rule 10b-5 to prohibit this and similar con- 
duct. Today, its protection extends also to purchasers defrauded by a misstatement 
or omission of a material fact with intent to mislead. Id. 
18. 17 C.F.R. # 240.1033-5. 
19. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976). 
20. WEN, supra note 9, # 13.2, at 670; see also Milton V. Freeman, Admin- 
istrative Procedures, 22 BUS. LAW. 891, 922 (1967) (revealing the lack of delibera- 
tion on Rule 10b-5). Justice Blackmun cpoted Professor Freeman's remarks in Blue 
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 US. 723, 767 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dis- 
senting). 
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B. Federal Common Law Regarding Section lo@) 
and Rule lob-5 
Patterned after section 17(a) of the 1933 Rule lob-5 
has become a powerful antifraud vehicle.22 Much of this power 
results from federal court interpretation finding a private right 
of action based on general tort principles. Courts have justified 
this expansion on the broad remedial nature of section 10(b).23 
Additionally, prior to 1994, federal courts had found an SEC 
action and an implied private action against aiders and abet- 
tors. 
1. The implied section lo@) private right of action 
A Pennsylvania federal district court in 1946 was the first 
court to  find a private action implied under section 10(b).~* In 
Kardon v. National Gypsum C O . , ~ ~  two shareholders brought 
an action against defendants for fraudulent misrepresentations 
and for suppression of information regarding a conspiracy to 
induce the shareholders to  sell their company stock for less 
than its fair market value.26 The district court recognized that 
neither section 1qb) nor Rule lob-5 expressly permits an in- 
jured investor to bring a civil suit against one who has violated 
21. See HAZEN, supra note 9, 8 13.2, a t  669 (noting that 8 17(a) was ex- 
panded in Rule lob-5 to cover misstatements and omissions intended to defraud in 
co~ec t ion  with both purchases and sales). Section 17(a) declares: 
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securi- 
ties by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or commu- 
nication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or 
indirectly- 
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or 
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of 
a material fad or any omission to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser. 
Securities Ad, ch. 38, tit. I, 8 17(a), 48 Stat. 84 (1933) (codified as amended at  15 
U.S.C. 8 77q(a) (1988)). 
22. W E N ,  supm note 9, 8 13.2, at  669; see, e.g., Cleary v. Perfedune, Inc., 
700 F.2d 774 (1st Cir. 1983); B r e ~ a n  v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. 
Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966). 
23. See, e.g., Brennan, 259 F. Supp. a t  680-81. 
24. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 513. 
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either provision. However, the court relied on the Restatement 
of Torts, section 286, to find an implied private right of action: 
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited 
act, or by failing to do a required act, makes the actor liable 
for an invasion of an interest of another if; [sic] (a) the intent 
of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an  inter- 
est of the other as  an individual; and (b) the interest invaded 
is one which the enactment is intended to protect. . . .27 
The court concluded that "[tlhe disregard of the command of a 
statute is a wrongful act and a tort,"28 and that "the [private] 
right is so fundamental and so deeply ingrained in the law that 
where it is not expressly denied the intention to withhold it 
should appear very clearly and plainly."2g 
Other federal courts, including the circuit courts of appeal, 
followed the Kardon rea~oning?~ In 1971 the United States 
Supreme Court effectually ratified the Kardon result in Super- 
intendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.;' 
where conspirators used a company's bond assets to  purchase 
company stock from the sole stockholder. The Court without 
analysis recognized "a private right of action . . . implied un- 
der $ 10(b).'"~ 
2. Implied actions against aiders and abettors 
Before Kardon and the promulgation of Rule lob-5, in SEC 
v. Time t r~s t ;~  a California federal district court recognized an 
SEC action to enjoin aiders and abettors under section 10(b)? 
Noting that other sections of the 1934 Act provided for an in- 
27. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934)). 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at  514. The court further justified its decision by referring to the 
maxim ubi jus ibi remedium. Id. at 513. That is, "Where there is a right, there is 
a remedy." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1520 (6th ed. 1990). 
30. See, e.g., Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970); Remar v. Clay- 
ton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 @. Mass. 1949). 
31. 404 U.S. 6, 7 (1971). Allegedly, conspirators deceived a Board of Directors 
into selling the company's bond assets and used the proceeds to purchase stock. Id. 
at  7-8 & n.1. However, the company's books indicated that the bond proceeds were 
represented by a certificate of deposit. In reality, the conspirators had employed a 
deceptive device to secure a loan and used the loan funds to acquire the certificate 
of deposit. Id. at 8-9. 
32. Id. at 13 n.9. 
33. 28 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1939), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 118 
F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1941). 
34. Id. at 43. 
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junction against aiders and abettors:' the Tinetrust court 
concluded that "no good reason appears why [section lqb)] 
should not apply in an injunctive proceeding to  restrain a viola- 
tion of the [I934 Act]."36 Other courts soon adopted the 
Timetrust rea~oning.~' 
Twenty-seven years after Timetrust, in Brennan v. Mid- 
western United Life Insurance Co.,S8 a United States district 
court in Indiana acknowledged an implied private action under 
section 1qb) and Rule lob-5 against aiding and abetting a 
section 10(b) violation.3g In Brennan, plaintiffs brought a class 
action against an insurance company "for aiding, abetting, and 
assisting" an alleged violation of the 1934 Act.40 Plaintiffs be- 
lieved they had purchased the insurance company's stock 
through a brokerage firm. Instead of carrying out the transac- 
tion, the brokerage firm used the investors' money for specula- 
tive purposes and misrepresented the reason that the stock had 
not been delivered. The insurance company, though aware of 
the brokerage firm's activities, failed to inform the SEC. Plain- 
tiffs alleged that the scheme put the insurance company in an 
enhanced position for potential mergers under negotiation and 
that the scheme substantially benefited its directors and offi- 
cers, who sold their company stock during the period of artifi- 
cial demand? 
The court in Brennan examined various cases finding an 
SEC action against aiding and abetting a section 1qb) violation 
and then addressed legislative history and policy arguments for 
implying a private right against the secondary  violator^.'^ U1- 
35. For example, the criminal statute 18 U.S.C. 0 2 states: "(a) Whoever 
commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, 
induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal." 18 U.S.C. 4 2 
(1988) (amending 18 U.S.C. 0 550 (1940)). 
36. Tinetrust, 28 F. Supp. at 43. 
37. See, e.g., SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); 
Fry v. Schumaker, 83 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa. 1947). 
38. 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966) (memorandum and order denying mo- 
tion to dismiss aiding and abetting action for, among other reasons, failure to state 
a claim). The initial ruling in Brennun was followed by a later decision on the 
merits in favor of plaintiffs' aiding and abetting claim. B r e ~ a n  v. Midwestern 
United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind. 1968), afd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th 
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970). 
39. See Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 676. 
40. Id. at 675. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 677-80; see i+ part IV.B.1. 
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timately, the court based its decision on section 876 of the Re- 
statement of Torts: 
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious 
conduct of another, a person is liable if he 
. . . .  
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of 
duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the 
other so to conduct himself, or 
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accom- 
plishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately 
considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third per- 
son.* 
The court concluded, "In the absence of a clear legislative ex- 
pression to the contrary, the statute must be flexibly applied so 
as to implement its policies and purposes.'* This rationale, 
based on tort doctrine and the court's analysis of congressional 
intent, became the standard for Brennan's progeny until Cen- 
tral Bank? 
A. The Facts 
In 1986 and 1988, a Colorado public housing authority 
issued bonds to fund public improvements at a private devel- 
opment. Under the bond covenants, landowner assessment 
liens valued at 160% of the outstanding bond debt were to be 
used as security. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. (Central Bank) 
was named the indenture trustee.46 
After a 1988 appraisal, the senior underwriter for the 1986 
issue contacted Central Bank, questioning compliance with the 
160% requirement. Central Bank's in-house appraiser reviewed 
the 1988 appraisal and, fearing the underwriter's suspicions 
43. RES~ATEMENT OF TORTS § 876 (1939), quoted in Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 
680. For a discussion questioning the validity of applying tort doctrine to find 
secondary liability under $ lo@), see Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability Under 
Section 1W) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CAL. L. REV. 80, 93-94 & n.81 
(1981). 
44. Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at  680-81. 
45. See, e.g., Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., 502 F.2d 731, 740 (10th Cir. 1974); 
SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 
(1975); Landy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1973), 
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); see also Fischel, supra note 43, at  84-85. 
46. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1443 (1994). 
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might be well-founded, recommended independent review. After 
corresponding with the developer, Central Bank decided to 
delay review until late 1988, well after the second issue closed. 
The public housing authority defaulted on the 1988 bonds be- 
fore the review was fini~hed.~' 
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. (First Interstate 
Bank) and Jack Naber sued the housing authority, Central 
Bank, and others for section 10(b) violations. The allegations 
against Central Bank were limited to  aiding and abetting?' 
At the district court level, summary judgment was granted for 
Central Bank.'g The Tenth Circuit reversed:' finding "a gen- 
uine issue of material fact as to the s~ienter"~' and "substan- 
tial assistance"52 elements. The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari on the question of whether recklessness is 
sufficient to prove aider and abettor liability under Rule lob-5. 
However, the Supreme Court also directed the parties "first t o  
brief and argue the following question: whether there is an 
implied private right of action for aiding and abetting viola- 
tions of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
and SEC Rule lob-5."53 
B. The Supreme Court's Reasoning 
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court held "that a 
private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit 
under 8 lo(b)."54 In support of its conclusion, the majority set 
forth three main arguments. First, within the statute's plain 
language, aiding and abetting is not mentioned; hence, a pri- 
vate right of action against it does not exist.55 Second, con- 
gressional silence and inaction are inconclusive of legislative 
intent? Third, policy is not the overriding issue; rather, the 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. First Interstate Bank v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891 (10th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub 
nom. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994). 
51. Id. at 904. 
52. Id. 
53. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2927, 2927 (1993) 
(granting certiorari). 
54. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1455 (1994). Jus- 
tice Kennedy, writing for the majority, was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices O'Co~or, Scalia, and Thomas. 
55. Id. at 1447-48. 
56. Id. at 1449-52. 
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issue is whether a private cause of action against aiders and 
abettors exists under section lqb)  and Rule lob-5.57 The fol- 
lowing discussion addresses each argument. 
1. Plain language of the statute governs 
Historically, courts reviewing implied private rights of 
action under section 1qb) had focused on the elements that 
would establish Rule lob-5 private liabilit~.~' However, in 
Central Bank, the Supreme Court scrutinized the "scope of 
conduct prohibited by 5 lqb)" and set forth a plain language 
approach to statutory interpretation." According to  the major- 
ity, when evaluating a statute's scope of liability, a court must 
look first at the plain language of the statute." If the mean- 
ing of a word or phrase is ambiguous, the court must defer t o  
the common meaning, absent legislative history evidencing an 
alternative meaning.61 Further clarifying, the Court stated 
that "ascertainment of congressional intent with respect to  the 
57. Id. at 1453-54. 
58. See, e,g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-54 (1983) (recognizing "the two 
elements . . . for establishing a Rule lob-5 violation: (i) the existence of a relation- 
ship affording access to inside information intended to be available only for a cor- 
porate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to  take ad- 
vantage of that information by trading without disclosure" (citation omitted)); Aaron 
v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701-02 (1980) (holding "that the [Securities and Exchange] 
Commission is required to establish scienter as an element of a civil enforcement 
action to enjoin violations of . . . § 100s) of the 1934 Act, and Rule lob-5 promul- 
gated under that section of the 1934 Act"). 
59. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1446. 
60. Id. at 1446-47. 
61. Id. The Court supported its method of analysis with several prior cases. 
For example, in Santa Fe Industries v. Green, the Court held that § lo@) did not 
reach a breach of a fiduciary duty against minority stockholders absent charges of 
misrepresentation or nondisclosure. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1446 (citing Santa 
Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 470 (1977)). It further emphasized, T h e  lan- 
guage of § 10(b) gives no indication that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct 
not involving manipulation or deception." Id. (quoting Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 473). 
In Chiarella v. United States, the Court found that "the 1934 Ad cannot be 
read more broadly than its language and the statutory scheme reasonably permit," 
and clarified that § lo( ' )  is a "catchall" only as to catching fraud. Chiarella v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980), quoted in Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 
1447. 
Additionally, in Ernst & E d  v. Hochfelder, the Court rejected the SEC's ar- 
gument that negligence satisfied Rule lob-5's scienter requirement, concluding that 
the SEC's interpretation did not conform to the statute's "commonly accepted 
meaning." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 198-99 (1976), quoted in 
Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1446. 
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scope of liability created by a particular section of the Securi- 
ties Act must rest primarily on the language of that section.'sZ 
In its analysis of section 10(b), the majority found no ex- 
press mention of aiding and abetting.63 It also rejected the 
SEC's argument (presented in an amicus brief) that the "direct- 
ly or indirectly" language of the statute encompasses aiding 
and abetting.64 The Court based its rationale on two points: 
(1) the traditional doctrine of aiding and abetting "extends 
beyond persons who engage, even indirectly, in a proscribed 
activity,"g5 and (2) other 1934 Act provisions use the "directly 
or indirectly" language in a manner that does not include liabil- 
ity for aiding and abetting? In addition, the majority assert- 
ed that Congress knows how to  promulgate aiding and abetting 
legislation when it wants to do so?? The Court reasoned that 
if Congress truly intended to  create aiding and abetting liabili- 
ty, it would have explicitly said so in the statute." 
According to  the Court's plain language approach,6' it did 
not need to  examine the legislative history, since the Court 
found the remaining language to be unambiguous and control- 
ling.?' Nevertheless, the Court examined Respondents' histori- 
cal arguments and concluded "that Congress likely would not 
have attached aiding and abetting liability to 8 10(b) had it 
provided a private 5 lqb)  cause of action."?' Relying on its 
methodology in Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Insur- 
62. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1447 (emphasis added) (quoting Pinter v. 
Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 653 (1988)). In Pinter v. DaM, the Court rejected an expansive 
definition of the term "seller" as used in 5 12(1) of the 1934 Act. 486 U.S. at 649- 
50. Although tort doctrine recognizes this delinition, the Court held that one must 
"look first at the language of [the statute]." Id. at 641. 
63. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1447. 
64. The SEC stated, "[Wle think that when read in context [§ lo@)] is broad 
enough to encompass liability for such 'indirect' violations." Id. (alterations in origi- 
nal) (quoting Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 8, 
Central Bank (No. 92-854)). 
65. Id. (emphasis added). The Court continues by stating that "aiding and 
abetting liability reaches persons who do not engage in the proscribed activities a t  
all, but who give a degree of aid to those who do." Id. 
66. Id. (citations omitted). 
67. Id. at 1448 (citations omitted). 
68. Id.; cfi Pinter v. Dahl, 486 US. 622, at 650 ("When Congress wished to 
create such liability, it had little trouble doing so."). 
69. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. 
70. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1448 (stating that "the statute itself resolves 
the case"). 
71. Id. at 1449 (citing Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 
113 S. Ct. 2085, 2091 (1993)). 
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a n ~ e ~ ~  and Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug  store^,'^ the 
Court looked to other express private actions in the securities 
acts to see whether any imposed civil liability on aiders and 
abettors.74 It found none.75 Accordingly, the Court deter- 
mined that to  find such liability under section 10(b) and Rule 
lob-5 would be inconsistent with the context of the 1934 
2. Congressional silence and inaction are inconclusive as to 
legislative intent 
The majority also addressed Respondents' arguments re- 
garding congressional silence and inaction. Respondents and 
the SEC argued "that Congress legislated with an understand- 
ing of general principles of tort law, and that aiding and abet- 
ting liability was 'well established in both civil and criminal ac- 
tions by 1934."'77 Therefore, the argument continued, "'Con- 
gress intended to include' aiding and abetting liability in the 
1934 Act."" The majority rejected this argument, contending 
that Congress has never passed a general civil statute prohibit- 
ing aiding and abetting, and hence the Court may not merely 
presume such a cause of action exists.7g The Court argued 
that Congress recognizes liability for aiding and abetting on a 
"statute-by-statute" basis, and thus statutory silence is not 
equivalent to legislative intent.80 
72. 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993). 
73. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). 
74. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at  1448-49. 
75. Id. at 1449. However, 18 U.S.C. § 2 imposes criminal liability for aiding 
and abetting federal crimes. See infra note 94. 
76. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at  1449. In Musick, the Court determined that 
"consistency requires [the Court] to adopt a like contribution rule for the right of 
action existing under Rule lob-5." 113 S. Ct. at  2091 quoted in Central Bank, 114 
S. Ct. at  1449. Likewise, in Blue Chip Stamps, the Court stated, "It would indeed 
be anomalous to impute to Congress an intention to expand the plaintiff class for 
a judicially implied cause of action beyond the bounds it delineated for comparable 
express causes of action." 421 U.S. at  736, quoted in Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at  
1449. 
77. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at  1450 (quoting Brief for Secunties and Ex- 
change Commission as Amicus Curiae at  10, Central Bank (No. 92-854)). 
78. Id. (quoting Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus 
Curiae at 11, Central Bank (No. 92-854)). 
79. Id. at 1450-51. 
80. Id. at 1451. The majority further argued that because the 1929 Uniform 
Sale of Securities Ad created an aiding and abetting cause of action, and because 
several states likewise used this language, it is 'hot plausible to interpret the 
statutory silence as tantamount to an implicit congressional intent to impose 
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In addition, Respondents set forth arguments regarding 
congressional ina~tion.~' Quoting from Patterson v. McLean 
Credit the Court replied: 
It does not follow . . . that Congress' failure to overturn a 
statutory precedent is reason for this Court to adhere to it. It 
is impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that 
eongressional failure to act represents affirmative congressio- 
nal approval of the [courts'] statutory interpretation. . . . Con- 
gressional inaction cannot amend a duly enacted statute? 
The Court conceded that its opinions have treated congressio- 
nal inaction arguments inconsi~tent l~ ,~ but concluded none- 
theless that these arguments "deserve little weight in the inter- 
pretive proce~s."~ 
3. Policy is not the overriding issue 
Early in its analysis the Court declared that "[tlhe is- 
sue . . . is not whether imposing private civil liability on aiders 
and abettors is good In an amicus brief, the SEC 
argued that a private cause of action for aiding and abetting 
should be implied because it "deters secondary actors from 
contributing to fraudulent activities and ensures that defraud- 
ed plaintiffs are made ~hole . '~ '  Acknowledging that policy 
justifkations exist on both sides, the Court focused on the "cer- 
tainty and predictability" required in this area of legal analy- 
# l qb )  aiding and abetting liability." Id. a t  1452. 
81. Id. at 1449-52. These arguments were substantially similar to those pre- 
sented in B r e ~ a n  v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 
1966). See infra part IV.B.1. 
82. 491 U.S. 164 (1989). 
83. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at  1453 (first omission and alteration in origi- 
nal) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting Patterson, 491 U.S. 
at 175 n.1). Note that the holding in Patterson was subsequently superseded by 
statute. See Mojica v. G a ~ e t t  Co., 779 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1991), reu'd, 7 F.3d 
552 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1643 (1994). 
84. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. a t  1453. 
85. Id. Likewise, the Court found "oblique references" to 8 10(b) liability for 
aiding and abetting in congressional committee reports unpersuasive. Id. at  1452 
(citing Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 168 (1989)). Note 
that the holding in Betts was subsequently superseded by statute. See EEOC v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 925 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1991). 
86. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1453 (emphasis added). The Court continued, 
explaining that the issue is "whether aiding and abetting is covered by the stat- 
ute." Id. 
87. Id. (citing Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curi- 
ae at 16-17, Central Bank (No. 92-854)). 
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sis, and the need to avoid "decisions 'made on an ad hoc ba- 
s i~ . ' "~  I t  then presented its own policy arguments against irn- 
plying a section 10(b) private right of action against aiders and 
abettors?' 
The Court suggested that while a Rule lob-5 extension to 
those who aid and abet securities fraud may make the statute 
more far-reaching, it does not necessarily serve the statute's 
objectives: "Secondary liability for aiders and abettors exacts 
costs that may disserve the goals of fair dealing and efficiency 
in the securities  market^."'^ Reiterating its argument in Blue 
Chip Stamps, the Court stated, "[Llitigation under Rule lob-5 
presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in 
kind from that which accompanies litigation in general," re- 
ferring to the excessive costs to secondary actors during even 
the pretrial stages of a suit." 
Additionally, the Court feared "ripple effects" of secondary 
liability under Rule lob-5, believing that professionals are less 
willing to give advice to new or small companies in light of 
possible securities litigation if the companies go under.g2 The 
Court speculated that, in such a case, professionals' "increased 
costs . . . may be passed on to their client companies" and ul- 
timately to  investors-those whom the statute purports to 
prote~t. '~ But as a rule, the Court declared: "Policy consider- 
ations cannot override our interpretation of the text and struc- 
ture of the Act, except to the extent that they may help to show 
that adherence to the text and structure would lead to a result 
'so bizarre' that Congress could not have intended it.'*4 
88. Id. at 1454 (quoting Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 652 (1988)). 
89. See id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 
(1975)). 
92. Id. 
93. Id. The Court further states that "it is far from clear that Congress in 
1934 would have decided that the statutory purposes would be furthered by the 
imposition of private aider and abettor liability." Id. 
94. Id. at 1453-54 (quoting Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 US. 184, 191 
(1991)). But see in* note 186 and accompanying text. 
Though not contended by this Note, the Court also found that 18 U.S.C. 3 2, a 
statute prohibiting aiding and abetting of a federal crime, does not necessarily 
extend to the civil or private context. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1454-55 ('We 
have been quite reluctant to infer a private right of action from a criminal prohibi- 
tion alone."). The SEC, however, argued that 18 U.S.C. 6 2 was "significant" and 
"very important," and from it the Court may derive a civ i l  remedy. Id. at 1454 
(quoting Transcript of Oral Argument 41, 43). The Court feared that to allow such 
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The majoritfs focus on whether the action was sustainable 
diluted what many thoughtg5-indeed, what the four Supreme 
Court dissenters and the parties thoughtg6-were the real is- 
sues presented for certiorari: (1) "whether an indenture trustee 
could be found liable as an aider and abettor absent a breach of 
an indenture agreement or other duty under state law," and (2) 
"whether [a trustee] could be liable as an aider and abettor 
based only on a showing of re~klessness.~' As the dissent 
pointed out, even Central Bank had presumed that a private 
right existed under section 10(b)g8 against one who aids and 
abets.gg However, rather than upholding a wealth of lower 
an extension here would logically require "a private right of action . . . for every 
provision of the 1934 Ad, for it is a criminal violation to violate any of its provi- 
sions." Id. at 1455 (citing 15 U.S.C. Q 78ff). Hence, the Court was unwilling to 
"shift . . . settled interpretive principles regarding implied causes of action." Id. 
In addition, the Court found the lob-5 reliance element was absent. Id. at 
1449-50. Citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), the Court stated, "A 
plaintiff must show reliance on the defendant's misstatement or omission to recover 
under lob-5." Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1449 (citing Basic Inc., 485 US. at 243). 
However, there is a trend to relax the reliance standard as applied to the securi- 
ties acts. See, e.g., Stahl v. Gibraltar Fin. Corp., 967 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(recognizing a private Q 14(a) adion, which also requires reliance, brought by an 
investor who had not personally relied on a misstatement or omission); Virginia 
Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1100 (1991) (Rather than "requiring 
individualized proof that enough . . . shareholders had relied upon the [defendant's] 
misstatements to swing the vote," the Court may find "a causal relationship by 
calling the [fraudulent statements] an 'essential link in the accomplishment of the 
transaction.'" (quoting Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 US. 375, 385 (1970))); 
Basic Inc., 485 US. at 247 ("Because most publicly available information is reflect- 
ed in market price, an investor's reliance on any public material misrepresenta- 
tions, therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule lob-5 action."). 
95. See Roberta S. Karmel, Implications of the 'Central Bank of Denver' Case, 
N.Y. LJ., June 16, 1994, at 3. 
96. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1455, 1457 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Jus- 
tice Stevens' dissent was joined by Justices Blackmun, Souter, and Ginsburg. Id. at  
1455. 
97. Id. at 1457. 
98. Except when discussing legislative intent and when otherwise indicated, 
any reference to Q 10(b) within this Part will imply a reference to Rule lob-5 as 
well. 
99. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at  1457 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
But instead of simply addressing the questions presented by the parties, 
on which the law really was unsettled, the Court sua sponte directed the 
parties to address a question on which even the petitioner justifiably 
thought the law was settled, and reache[d] out to overturn a most con- 
siderable body of precedent. 
Id. 
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federal court precedent,''' the majority deferred to the rea- 
soning of Professor Daniel R. Fischel in his 1981 arti~le,'~' 
Secondary Liability Under Section lo@) of the Securities Act of 
1 934. '02 
Borrowing from the doctrine of strict cons t~c t ion '~~  and 
from recent case law,'04 the Court tailored a plain language 
approach. The Court purported to  look first at the statutory 
language and then, if necessary, at legislative history to resolve 
ambiguities as t o  the scope of liability, resting its "ascertain- 
ment of congressional intent . . . primarily on the language of 
that section* of the statute.'05 However, the majority did not 
precisely follow this pattern of interpretation; it examined 
legislative history not strictly tied to the ambiguous statutory 
words and looked to other sections of the securities acts for 
further interpretive guidance.lo6 
Indeed, the Court should examine legislative history and 
policy in spite of its purportedly strict approach.'07 A -  plain 
language analysis is far too restrictive for interpreting a civil 
100. See infra part 1V.A. 
101. Central B a d ,  114 S. Ct. at  1444. 
102. Fischel, supra note 43. Fischel argues that "the theory of secondary lia- 
bility is no longer viable in light of recent Supreme Court decisions strictly inter- 
preting the federal securities laws. . . . [Lliability for d l  defendants must be deter- 
mined by the language, structure, and legislative history of the relevant statutes." 
Id. at 82. However, he also says that "[dleceptive conduct by attorneys and accoun- 
tants, whether previously analyzed as aiding and abetting or as a direct violation, 
should continue to be prohibited by [$ lo&)] and [Rule lob-51, provided the other 
elements of liability . . . are satisfied." Id. at  108. 
103. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1445-48 (1994); Karmel, supra note 95, at  
3. Strict construction is that method of statutory interpretation that "refuses to 
expand the law by implications or equitable considerations, confiding] the law's 
operation to cases which are clearly within the letter of the statute as well as 
within its spirit or reason." B L A C ~ S  LAW DICTIONARY 1422 (6th ed. 1990) (citation 
omitted). In modern practice, however, a strict construction argument is typically 
accompanied by legislative history and strong policy favoring the result. See, e.g., 
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734-37 (1975) (demonstrat- 
ing this practice). The doctrine of strict construction is commonly applied to rrimi- 
nal statutes, see Matthews v. Powers, 425 P.2d 479, 482 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967), 
although courts have used it in interpreting civil statutes as well. See, e.g., Blue 
Chip Stamps, 421 US. at 734-36. However, in the civil context its rigidity can 
stifle the effectiveness of a statute with an underlying broad remedial purpose. See 
Harvey Gelb, Implied Private Actions Under SEC Rules 14a-9 and lob-5: The Im- 
pact of Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 76 w. L. REV. 363, 378 (1993). 
104. See supra notes 61-62. 
105. Central B a d ,  114 S. Ct. at 1447 (quoting Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 
653 (1988)). 
106. See id. at 144743. 
107. See supra note 103. 
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statute intended to provide a broad remedial scheme. However, 
the Court's deviation failed t o  go far enough-in examining 
congressional intent it gave inadequate credence to the full 
historical backdrop, much of which arguably supports finding 
secondary liability.'" Furthermore, what little policy the ma- 
jority addressed1" was speculative and unpersuasive in light 
of contrary arguments.'1° Additionally, the Court slighted 
long-standing lower court precedent. Although one of these 
shortcomings, by itself, may be insufficient to  justify a contrary 
ruling, the aggregate makes the Central Bank decision at least 
questionable, and demonstrates the Court's struggle to  justify 
its conclusions in light of contrary lower court precedent, con- 
gressional intent, and policy c~nsiderations.~" 
A. Precedent Applying Tort Law Principles to Section 
1016) and Rule lob-5  Finds a Cause of Action 
Against Aiders and Abettors 
As Justice Stevens argued in his dissent, a large body of 
precedent finds aider and abettor liability under section 10(b) 
and Rule lob-5.'12 Based on tor t  law prin~iples,"~ eleven 
circuit courts had found an implied right of action against aid- 
ing and abetting a section 10(b) ~iolation."~ Before Central 
108. Although the Court briefly addressed some historical elements, such as 
congressional inaction, Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1449-52, and "oblique referenc- 
es" by committee reports, id. at 1452-53, it dismissed them as "deserv[ing] little 
weight in the interpretive process," id. at  1453. 
109. See id. at 1453-54; see also supra part III.B.3. 
110. See infra part 1V.B-C. 
111. For a brief critique of Central Bank on two of these points, see Develop- 
ments in the Law-Lawyers' Responsibilities and Lawyers' Responses, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 1547, 1620-22 (1994), and compare Gelb, supra note 103, at 378 (Commenting 
on Virginia Bankshres, Inc. v. Sandberg, Gelb states, "The importance of [deter- 
ring] misrepresentations and the weakness of the policy reasons offered for re- 
striction of the implied action, are powerful factors cutting against the Court's 
narrow interpretation."). 
112. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1456 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
113. See, e.g., Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir. 1983) 
(applying a close predecessor to the modern test, which relies on tort doctrine); 
Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D. Ind. 
1966) (relying on RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 5 876). 
114. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1456 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a list in- 
cluding cases from each circuit, see id. at 1456 n.1. The dissent noted that the 
D.C. Circuit had "not . . . squarely recognized aiding and abetting in private 
8 10(b) actions" in Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd on other 
grounds, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), but that the same circuit "ha[d] suggested that such 
a claim was available in private actions" in Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 
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Bank, such an action generally required three elements: "(i) the 
existence of a primary violation of 5 10(b) or Rule lob-5, (ii) the 
defendant's knowledge of (or recklessness as to) that primary 
violation, and (iii) 'substantial assistance' of the violation by 
the defendant."ll5 The Seventh Circuit also required that the 
defendant have committed a primary violation.ll6 
Early in its opinion, the majority referred to a "continuing 
confusion," due, inter alia, to  the Seventh Circuit's variation 
and Fifth Circuit dicta: "There is a powerful argument that . . . 
aider and abettor liability should not be enforceable by private 
parties pursuing an implied right of action.""' One might 
question, however, whether two doubting circuits constitute a 
"confusion" of such great magnitude as to justify a review up- 
ending nearly thirty years of lower court precedent. Since the 
Seventh Circuit's review of the aiding and abetting claim in 
Brennan. most circuits have continually found a section 10(b) 
private cause of action against aiders and abettors.ll8 Even 
though this precedent was never formally approved by the 
Supreme Court, the Court had opportunity to review and rule 
other~ise."~ Although a denial of review is not approval per 
se, it has the effect of downplaying any question as to the exis- 
tence of the particular cause of action that has progressed 
through the lower courts. Accordingly, in the minds of most 
F.2d 27, 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1456 n.1 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
In addition, the dissent recognized that the Seventh Circuit would only find 
liability for aiding and abetting under 6 10(b) if the alleged aider and abettor was 
also a primary violator. Id.; see infra note 116. 
115. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1457 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Cleary, 
700 F.2d at 776-77; IIT, An Intl Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 
1980)). 
116. Id. at 1456 n.1. When the Seventh Circuit reviewed Brennan v. Midwest- 
ern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind. 1968), affd, 417 F.2d 147 
(7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 US. 989 (1970), in which the district court decid- 
ed in favor of the merits of plaintiffs' aiding and abetting claim, the Seventh 
Circuit's analysis was evidentiary and did not question the lob-5 elements. See 
B r e ~ a n  v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147, 150 (7th Cir. 1969), 
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970). Later, the Seventh Circuit began requiring that 
the alleged aider and abettor also have committed a primary violation before a 
cause of action for aiding and abetting could be sustained. See Robin v. Arthur 
Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120, 1123 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. dented, 499 U.S. 923 
(1991). 
117. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1444 (omission in original) (quoting Akin v. 
Q-L Invs., 959 F.2d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1992)). 
118. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
119. See, e.g., Midwestern United Life Ins. Co. v. B r e ~ a n ,  397 US. 989 
(1970) (denying certiorari). 
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federal court judges, a private right against aiding and abetting 
clearly existed.'" Justice Stevens commented, "If indeed 
there has been 'continuing confusion' concerning the private 
right of action against aiders and abettors, that codusion has 
not concerned its basic structure, still less its 'existence. 9 ,9121 
Moreover, "settled construction of an important federal 
statute should not be disturbed unless and until Congress so 
 decide^."'^^ The majority acknowledged the lower court prece- 
dent and its basis in tort theory only to counter that not all 
states clearly recognize aiding and abetting liability in tort? 
That point, however, is analytically weak. Lower court prece- 
dent has derived a private right of action against aiding and 
abetting from general tort law principles, not those recognized 
by any one state.'" For several decades most federal courts 
have recognized an implied section 10(b) cause of action against 
aiding and abetting. The fact that a few states do not recognize 
aiding and abetting in tort should have no bearing on federal 
precedent concerning federal statutory law, especially when the 
statute was created during an era when Congress and the 
courts recognized a federal common law.'* Furthermore, 
none of the majority's supporting casedz6 "involved a settled 
course of lower court pre~edent."'~' In essence, the Court 
failed to give adequate credence to  long-standing precedent and 
justified this omission with an analytically weak argument. 
120. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
121. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. a t  1457 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omit- 
ted). 
122. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 74 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
"The longstanding acceptance by the courts, coupled with Congress' failure to  re- 
ject" it, support retaining a particular judicial ruling. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 (1975). 
123. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1450 (citing cases from Maine, Pe~sylvania ,  
Virginia, and Montana). 
124. See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. 
Ind. 1966). 
125. See discussion infra note 144. 
126. See supra notes 61-62. 
127. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1458 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 113 S. Ct. 2063 (1993); Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 
635 n.12 (1988); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 229 n.11 (1980); Santa 
Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 475-76 11.15 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 
425 U.S. 185, 191-92 n.7 (1976)). 
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B. Congressional Intent Supports Finding an Aiding and 
Abetting Action Under Section 10(b) 
In its analysis, the Court dismissed s i m c a n t  elements of 
legislative history that support finding a right of private action 
for aiding and abetting under section 10(b).12' Though legisla- 
tive and administrative history alone should not always be 
conclusive of congressional intent, such history should be given 
substantial consideration when the Court examines provisions 
enacted over a half century earlier. Furthermore, in its analy- 
sis of the "directly or indirectly" language,129 the Court 
analogized incompatible sections of the securities acts to  con- 
clude that such language should not be construed to reach 
aiders and abettors. 
1. Historical context 
"[Tlhe Legislature's failure to reject a consistent judicial or 
administrative construction counsels hesitation from a court 
asked to invalidate it."lso Justice Stevens points out that 
"judges closer to  the times and climate of the 73d Congress 
than [the contemporary Court] concluded that holding aiders 
and abettors liable was consonant with the 1934 Act's purpose 
to strengthen the antifkaud remedies of the common law."131 
Indeed, the district court in Brennan v. Midwestern United Life 
Insurance Co. found such liability a 'logical and natural com- 
plement to the [implied section 10(b) private right of ac- 
t i~n] . " '~~  A brief examination of the legislative intent argu- 
ments presented in Brennan helps to establish the historical 
context surrounding section 10(b) and Rule lob-5.1SS Specifi- 
cally, the Brennan court looked at congressional inaction, com- 
mentary, and SEC memoranda. Its reasoning is further sup- 
ported by the validity of certain legislative assumptions and 
the appropriate interpretation of congressional silence. 
128. See Centml Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1452-53. 
129. See id. at 1447-48. 
130. Id. at 1458 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
131. Id. at 1456 (footnote omitted); see d s o  B r e ~ a n  v. Midwestern United Life 
Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147, 155 (7th Cir. 1969) ("A basic philosophy of the [I9341 Act 
is . . . directed toward the creation and maintenance of a post-issuance securities 
market that is free from fraudulent practices. The investor's protection is the para- 
mount consideration."), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970). 
132. B r e ~ a n  v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680 
(N.D. Ind. 1966). 
133. For a brief recitation of the facts in Brennan, see supm part II.B.2. 
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a. Congressional inaction, cornmentar y, and SE C 
memoranda. The defendant in Brennan contended that be- 
cause a proposed amendment to section 1qb) that would have 
expressly provided a private remedy against aiders and abet- 
tors was never adopted, Congress evidently did not believe the 
section would apply to aiders and abettors.'" However, the 
Brennan court pointed out that this particular amendment was 
packaged with other items and, therefore, dismissal of the 
entire package did not conclusively indicate congressional in- 
tent regarding the proposed aiding and abetting amend- 
ment.'" The court noted that, like the aiding and abetting 
proposal, other items in the rejected package already benefited 
from judicial recognition but were seeking explicit statutory 
expression. The congressional committee, nevertheless, cate- 
gorically excluded the other proposed items because it deemed 
codification unnecessary. '" The Brennan court suggested 
that Congress may have declined to ratie the aider and abettor 
portion for the same reason.13' 
In further addressing this congressional inaction, the court 
quoted Justice Jackson, writing for the Supreme Court in an 
earlier opinion: 'We draw, therefore, no inference in favor of 
either construction of the Act-from the Department's request 
for legislative clarification, from the congressional committee's 
willingness to consider it, or from Congress' failure to enact 
it."lS8 The Supreme Court in Central Bank quoted a similar 
statement in refuting the Respondents' argument that the 
Court should follow statutory precedent unless Congress has 
abrogated it: "It is impossible to  assert with any degree of as- 
surance that congressional failure to act represents affirmative 
congressional approval of the [courts'] statutory interpreta- 
134. Brennan, 259 I?. Supp. at 677. 
135. Id. at 677-78. The court also related that in 1960 an aiding and abetting 
amendment had passed in the Senate, but that the House never acted upon it. Id. 
136. See id. at 678 (construing S. REP. NO. 1757, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 
(1960)). 
137. See id. The Brennan court also pointed out that "[alt the time these 
amendments were being considered, Congress was convened in special session late 
in the summer of a Presidential election year and much proposed legislation fell 
victim to a lack of time." Id. at 679-80. 
138. Id. at 679 (quoting Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 47-48 
(1950), modi.fied, 339 U.S. 908 (1950)). 
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tion."lSg The Court in Central Bank conceded, however, that 
its opinions have been inconsistent on this point.140 
More persuasive was the Brennan court's finding, based on 
a Senate report, that "legislative history does indicate that the 
purpose of the unadopted aider and abettor amendments was 
'to strengthen and clarify the injunctive power' rather than to 
add a new element to  the power of the SEC."l4l The court 
noted also that General Counsel for the SEC issued a mem- 
orandum explaining "that the amendment would 'make 
manifest' the responsibility of aiders and abettors,"142 and 
"'remove the ambiguity' since 'there may exist some doubt as to 
the Commission's authority to obtain an injunction, or impose 
administrative sanctions, against persons aiding or abetting 
violations of the act."'14s 
b. Legislative assumptions. The Brennan court in- 
ferred that Congress recognized the SECs injunctive power in 
the aiding and abetting context from the fact that Timetrust 
and its progeny had already been decided when the clarifying 
amendment came before Congress. In fad, courts of that time 
"regularly assumed . . . that a statute enacted for the benefit of 
a particular class conferred on members of that class the right 
to sue violators of that statute."lu For example, immediately 
139. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1453 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.1. (1989)). 
140. Id. Hence, the inaction argument seems to fail when, as in Wong Yang 
Sung and Patterson, a court seeks a result otherwise denounced by a congressional 
inaction argument. 
141. Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 678 (quoting S. REP. NO. 1757, 86th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 8 (1960)). 
142. Id. (quoting Hearings on S. 1178-1182 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate 
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 276 (1959)). 
143. Id. (quoting Hearings on S. 1178-1182 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate 
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 335 (1959)). The defendant, 
however, countered with a second SEC memorandum stating that the New York 
Stock Exchange W S E )  desired aiders and abettors of 4 10(b) violations to be sub- 
ject only to SEC actions. Id. The memo further indicated SEC satisfaction with 
such a limitation. The court speculated as to motives behind the memo and the 
resulting inconsistency, ultimately stating that neither the [MISEI's intent nor the 
SEC's acquiescence necessarily demonstrates congressional intent. Id. at 679. Note, 
however, that if the Brennan court were to extend this rationale to its examination 
of the h t  memo, its assertion based on the first memo would be moot. 
144. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1457 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In support of 
this conclusion, the dissent in Central Bank refers the reader to Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, F e ~ e r  & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 US. 353, 374-78 (1982). For addition- 
al supporting cases, see Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1457 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissent- 
ing). 
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before the securities acts were passed, the Supreme Court 
instructed in Piedmont & Northern Railway Co. v. ICC that "a 
broader and more liberal interpretation than that to  be drawn 
from mere dictionary definitions of the words employed by Con- 
gress" should be used to analyze "remedial legi~lation.""~ In 
contrast, the modern Court has set forth in Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder that one must look to the language's "commonly 
accepted meaning."'" 
The modern Court's plain language approach differs radi- 
cally from the Court's interpretive approach in 1934. Since the 
73d Congress would have expected the judiciary to interpret its 
legislation according to the practice of the judiciary of that 
time, the modern Court should follow the then-current inter- 
pretive methods if it wishes to be faithful to the original legis- 
lation. By applying a plain language analysis, the modern 
Court reaches a result opposite of that achieved by earlier 
courts and of that likely expected by the enacting Con- 
gress. 14' 
c. Legislative competence and silence. The majority 
in Central Bank suggested also that Congress knew how to  
include aiding and abetting in a statutory scheme when it 
intended to do so,148 and, thus, Congress' silence indicates in- 
tent for the statute to  reach only primary ~iolators. '~~ How- 
ever, using this same rationale, Congress' failure to  enact a 
statute to abrogate the widespread judicial understanding 
could imply that Congress agreed with the rulings recognizing 
an aiding and abetting cause of action.'50 Because legislative 
Note that Congress passed the securities acts before Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 
304 U.S. 64 (1938), which held that "[tlhere is no federal . . . common law." Id. at  
78. Before Erie, Congress assumed that federal courts could create private rights of 
action, based on statutes, using a tort analysis. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 
Pet.) 1 (1842). 
145. 286 U.S. 299, 311 (1932). 
146. 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) (citing Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods. 322 
U.S. 607, 617-18 (1944)); see supra note 61. 
147. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1457-58 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
There is a risk of anachronistic error in applying our current approach to implied 
causes of action to a statute enacted when courts commonly read statutes of this 
kind broadly to accord with their remedial purposes and regularly approved rights 
to sue despite statutory silence." Id. at 1457 (citation omitted). 
148. Id. at 1448. 
149. See id. 
150. See id. at 1458 & n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), the Court used this argument to  ratify 
the Birnbaum doctrine (Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d 
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silence may be inconclusive of legislative intent, one should 
question whether a plain language approach, which often inter- 
prets silence as an expression of intent, is desirable in constru- 
ing a statute with broad remedial scope.lS1 
The weight of legislative history supports a reasonable 
inference that Congress approved of aiding and abetting liabili- 
ty under section 10(b).lS2 Even though the statute does not 
expressly provide for a cause of action against aiders and abet- 
tors, there is legislative commentary clearly recognizing such a 
right. Furthermore, the statute's broad reference to fraud, the 
expansive nature of both the 1934 Act and section 10(b), and 
the common practice at the time of enactment of broadly in- 
terpreting a remedial statute all combine to  support the rea- 
sonableness of the interpretation. 
2. Statutory language: "directly or indirectly" 
Both section lqb)  and Rule lob-5 contain the language, "It 
shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly" to  com- 
mit fraud in the disclosure of, or relating to, securities transac- 
t i o n ~ . ' ~ ~  Respondents and the SEC in Central Bank suggested 
that the term "indirectly" could be construed to encompass 
aiders and abettors since they are indirect defrauders? Ap- 
plying Professor Fischel's reasoning,155 the Supreme Court 
rejected this argument, deciding that such a finding would be 
inconsistent with the use of "directly or indirectly" in other 
provisions of the 1934 Act: 
15 U.S.C. 5 78g(f)(2)(C) (direct or indirect ownership of 
stock); . . . 15 U.S.C. 5 78i(b)(2)-(3) (direct or indirect interest 
in put, call, straddle, option or privilege); . . . 15 
U.S.C. $ 78m(d)(l) (direct or indirect ownership); . . . 15 
U.S.C. 5 78p(a) (direct or indirect ownership); . . . 15 
Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952)) and hold that a plaintiff must be a pur- 
chaser or seller of securities to have standing to sue under Rule lob-5. Blue Chip 
Stamps, 421 U.S. at 733. However, in Reves v. Ernst & Young, the Court ignored 
many years uf unanimous precedent by the circuits, which had held that the nine- 
month exemption for notes was limited to commercial paper. 494 US. 56, 74 
(1990) (Stevens, J., concurring). Thus, the Court appears to invoke widespread judi- 
cial understanding when that understanding supports the Court's conclusion and 
ignore it when it does not. 
151. See Gelb, supra note 103, at 378; see also supra note 14. 
152. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1458 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
153. 15 U.S.C. 8 78. (emphasis added); 17 C.F.R. 9 240.1023-5 (emphasis added). 
154. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1447. 
155. See Fischel, supra note 43, at 94 n.83. 
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U.S.C. $ 78t (direct or indirect control of person violating 
Act). 156 
The Court cited these provisions to illustrate its argument that 
to the 73d Congress, "indirect violations" did not imply the aid- 
ing and abetting of violations. 
On its face, the majority's argument would seem to have 
merit: Because "numerous provisions of the 1934 Act. . . use 
the term ['indirectly'] in a way that does not impose aiding and 
abetting liability,"15' its usage in section 10(b) was probably 
not intended to impose such liability. The argument would be 
stronger, however, if the "numerous provisions" were of a na- 
ture that could give rise to liability for aiding and abetting. For 
example, three of the cited provisions involve a question of 
"direct or indirect" securities ownership,158 but liability for 
aiding and abetting has no meaning in the context of owner- 
ship.'" The other provisions using this language apply the 
terms to interests in derivatives and control over a 
vi01ator.l~~ None of these contexts would typically support an 
aiding and abetting construction because none of them involve 
an act that could inherently give rise to the existence of an 
aider and abettor?' However, section 10(b) does. Specifically, 
its Rule lob-5 prohibits fraudulent acts, misstatements, and 
 omission^.'^^ In this context, there can be aiders and abettors 
to the conduct of a primary violator. Hence, arguably the Court 
156. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. a t  1448. 
157. Id. at 1447. Consider, however, the language of 18 U.S.C. $ 203): 'Who- 
ever willfully causes an a d  to be done which if directly performed hy him or an- 
other would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal." 
Id. (emphasis added). Although $ 2 is a criminal statute and not a part of the 
1934 Act, one should note that the term "directly" in $ 203) is used to describe a 
primary violator. Hence, one could logically infer "indirectly" to mean a peripheral 
violator in an analogous context. Arguably, however, a private civil action under 
$ lo@) is not analogous to a federal criminal action. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. 
at 1455. Furthermore, 18 U.S.C. $ 2(a) deems an aider and abettor liable as a 
principal for criminal acts without employing the term "indirectly." 
158. 15 U.S.C. $ 78g(f)(2)(C) (1988); 15 U.S.C. $ 78m(d)(l) (1988); 15 U.S.C. 
$ 78p(a) (1988). 
159. How does one aid and abet ownership of property? 
160. 15 U.S.C. $ 78i(b)(2)-(3) (1988); 15 U.S.C. $ 78t(a)-(b) (1988). 
161. Perhaps the provision addressing direct or indirect control over a primary 
violator could give rise to the existence of aider and abettor liability (for example, 
aiding and abetting control over a primary violator). However, aiding and abetting 
a 8 1003) violation is a reasonably conceivable act, and liability for it is a "logical 
and natural complement to the [implied $ 10(b) private right]." B r e ~ a n  v. Mid- 
western United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D. Ind. 1966). 
162. 17 C.F.R. 8 240.10b-5. 
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analogized incompatible statutes, yielding an unsubstantiated 
conclusion. Moreover, in previous years the High Court typi- 
cally read the language of the securities legislation aimed at 
protecting against fraud "not technically and restrictively, but 
flexibly t o  effectuate its remedial purposes."'" 
C. The Policy Justifjing an Implied Private Right of 
Action Against Primary Section 1 O(b) Violations 
Also Justifies an Implied Section lo@) 
Aiding and Abetting Right of Action 
The implied private right of action against primary section 
lqb)  violators has received much ~riticism.'~ Nevertheless, 
when properly supported by the SEC and adjudicated by the 
federal courts, the implied section 10(b) private right plays a 
valuable role in the securities arena.165 The implied private 
right primarily serves three functions: deterrence, restitution, 
and SEC enforcement support.lB6 It deters fraud by judicially 
reaching section 10(b) violators. It restores by helping to return 
fraudulently lost investment capital to the defrauded investors, 
as well as to the market. It supports SEC enforcement by inci- 
dentally relieving the SEC of many complaints that would 0th- 
163. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1459 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 
(1972)). But cf. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980) ("[Tlhe Court has also 
noted that generalized references to the remedial purposes of the securities laws 
will not justify reading a provision more broadly than its language and the statuto- 
ry scheme reasonably permit." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
164. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under 
the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 963, 
969-71 (1994). 
165. "[Plroperly circumscribed private rights of action serve as a valuable ad- 
junct to an agency's own enforcement program . . . ." Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. 
Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look Ahead a t  the Next Decade, 7 
YALE J. ON REG. 149, 183 (1990). "[Plrivate actions have become increasingly im- 
portant as an enforcement tool in light of the dramatic growth of fraud and cor- 
ruption in the Nation's capital markets and financial institutions." Securities Hear- 
ings, supra note 14, at  124 (Prepared Statement of Mark J. Grifh, Securities 
Division, Department of Commerce, Salt Lake City, UT). Furthermore, allegations 
regarding a current "litigation explosion" due to securities litigation are unsubstan- 
tiated. "[Slecurities litigation accounted for less than one percent of all cases filed 
in Federal courts in fiscal 1991 . . . ." Id. at  123 (Prepared Statement of Mark J. 
Griffin, Securities Division, Department of Commerce, Salt Lake City, UT) (footnote 
omitted). 
166. See Securities Hearings, supm note 14, at  124 (Prepared Statement of 
Mark J. Grifth, Securities Division, Department of Commerce, Salt Lake City, UT); 
id. at 111 (Testimony of William R. McLucas, Diredor, Division of Enforcement, 
United States Securities and Exchange Comm.). 
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erwise come to  the Commission and further increase its heavy 
workload. '67 
Professor Joseph A. Grundfest argues, however, that the 
private right has several detrimental effects, one of which is 
encouraging frivolous private suits.lB8 Grundfest asserts that 
the SEC rejects cases with a "relatively low probability of suc- 
cess," and that such cases may be among those brought by pri- 
vate p l a in tB~ . '~~  Thus, the partial alleviation of the SEC's 
burden may be somewhat illusory. However, even if 
Grundfest's observation is valid, such an effect may be bene- 
ficial, since the SEC's rejection of a particular case may rest 
more upon budgetary constraints in gathering evidence than 
upon the merits of the case.170 If so, then the private right 
has further justification. 
In Central Bank, the majority set aside policy arguments 
favoring the private right against aiding and abetting and 
focused instead on its own policy rationalein essence, predict- 
ability and deterrence of vexatious litigation."' These policy 
arguments, however, are inconsistent with the probable effect 
of the Court's holding and "are inapposite to  SEC enforcement, 
because the SEC can clarify the rules of conduct that it enforc- 
es through the promulgation of regulations . . . Like the 
implied private right of action against primary section 10(b) 
violations, an implied section 10(b) right of action against aid- 
ing and abetting promotes good policies:'" (1) protecting in- 
vestors by prohibiting all manipulative and deceptive conduct 
in the securities arena, (2) providing investors a remedy t o  
restore their defrauded funds,'" and (3) relieving the SEC of 
167. See infia notes 190-192 and accompanying text. 
168. Grundfest, supra note 164, at 969-70. 
169. Id. 
170. See Securities Hearings, supra note 14, at 113 (Testimony of William R. 
McLucas, Director, Division of Enforcement, United States Securities and Exchange 
Comm.). 
171. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1454; see also discussion supm part 
III.B.3. 
172. Developments in the Law, supm note 111, at 1621. 
173. But cf. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980) ("[Ilf the language of a 
provision of the securities laws is sufficiently clear in its context and not at odds 
with the legislative history, it is unnecessary 'to examine the additional consider- 
ations of policy . . . that may have influenced the lawmakers in their formulation 
of the statute.'" (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 n.33 
(1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). As previously demonstrated, however, 
the language is not clear (see supra part IV.B.2.); thus, policy should be examined 
here. 
174. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1453 (citing Brief for Securities and Ex- 
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the complaints that could otherwise overwhelm the Commis- 
sion.17' Most significant are the deterrence and restitution 
elements. 
Before the Court's decision in Central Bank, aiding and 
abetting actions under section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 had com- 
monly been brought against professional and service organiza- 
tions such as accounting firms, law firms, broker-dealer firms, 
investment banking firms, and banks. Issuers and other play- 
ers need the services offered by these entities to  enter the mar- 
ketplace and accomplish securities transactions. As gatekeepers 
of the marketplace, these organizations may be influenced by 
potential liability as an aider and abettor and thus be deterred 
from assisting fraudulent activities of primary players.176 In 
addition, these gatekeepers are typically solvent and may carry 
malpractice or omissions insurance, or both. Primary violators, 
however, are typically insolvent. Thus, an organization 
that chooses to assist fraudulent activities would help provide 
restitution to defrauded investors who would otherwise have 
little or no remedy against primary vi01ators.l~~ 
change Commission as Amicus Curiae at  16-17, Central Bank (No. 921854)). Be- 
cause the primary violator is typically insolvent (or nearly insolvent) by the time a 
suit is launched, a suit against the solvent aider and abettor can serve to make 
the defrauded investor whole. Granted, here an element of unfairness exists toward 
an aider and abettor, since he or she might be found financially liable for the 
entire fraud. This inequity could be alleviated by altering the liability of a periph- 
eral defendant to proportionate liability instead of joint and several liability. For a 
proposed law advocating this position, see S. 1976, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 3 203 
(1994). 
175. See infia notes 190-192. Even if Central Bank denies SEC civil enforce- 
ment actions against aiding and abetting $ 10(b) violations, complaints addressing 
other causes of action (for example, a 3 20(a) action against a control person) may 
increase, serving as alternative outlets for investor relief. See i*a part V.A. 
176. See Developments in the Law, supra note 111, at 1621-22; Note that the 
gatekeepers might also be liable as primary violators. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. 
at 1455 (referring to Fischel, supra note 43, at 107-08). 
177. See John T. Vangel, Note, A Complici&-Doctrine Approach to Section 1Ofi.I 
Aiding and Abetting Civil Damages Actions, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 180, 180 (1989) 
(citing Harris J. Amhowitz, The Accounting Profession and the Law: The Misunder- 
stood Victim, J. ACCT., May 1987, at 356, 359). 
178. Notice, however, that malpractice premiums and damage awards are at 
least partly passed on to clients as a cost of doing business. To more accurately 
determine the strength of these policy considerations, a cost-spreading analysis 
would seem appropriate. Such an analysis, however, will not be attempted here 
since its conclusion would only be tangential to the argument presented herein. 
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The ramifications of this decision are somewhat disturbing. 
Investors must now look to other alternatives to be made whole 
when primary defrauders are insolvent. Although so-called 
aiders and abettors may possibly be recharacterized as primary 
violators under section 10(b), the difficulty of showing lob-5 
primary liability nevertheless decreases the restitution poten- 
tial of a private suit. Within recent months, the SEC has dis- 
missed numerous cases alleging aiding and abetting under 
section 10(b), believing (or at least fearing) that the Central 
Bank ruling extends to  SEC enforcement actions.'" Even if 
the ruling does not prohibit SEC actions, it places a substan- 
tially greater enforcement burden upon the agency. Further, if 
the ruling is a trend toward relying solely on the strict statuto- 
ry wording of section 10(b), one must ask whether it also 
threatens the validity of implying a section 1qb) private right 
of action. 
A. Investor Rights 
Although the holding in Central Bank may produce some 
desirable effects, such as partially shielding professionals from 
frivolous secondary liability suits,lsO defrauded investors 
must look to new avenues for restitution from true aiders and 
abettors. Options include applying state blue-sky laws, bringing 
common law fraud a~tions,'~' arguing an alternative action, 
arguing that the aider and abettor is really a primary 
violator,1s2 or pursuing new federal legislation that, if adopt- 
179. See Arthur F. Mathews & W. Hardy Callcott, lightening Securities Laws, 
137 N.J. L.J. 1758, 1759 (1994) ("As a result of Central Bank, the SEC has dis- 
missed most of its cases seeking to hold defendants liable as aiders and abetters of 
Rule lob-5 violations."). But, for a "hypothetical opinion of some future Supreme 
Court" holding that the Centml Bank ruling is limited to private actions, see Si- 
mon M. Lorne, Central Bank of Denver v. SEC, 49 BUS. LAW. 1467, 1467 (1994). 
180. See Alan M. Slobodin, Justices Weigh in on Business, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 15, 
1994, at  C6, C10 ("[Mlany securities fraud claims against professionals traditionally 
have been based on aiding and abetting theories."). 
181. Mathews & Callcott, supra note 179, at 1761. 
182. "Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who em- 
ploys a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on 
which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator 
under lob-5, assuming all- of the requirements for primary liability under Rule 
lob-5 are met." Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1455 (1994) (referring to Fischel, 
supm note 43, a t  107-08). 
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ed, would restore a private right against aiders and 
abettors. 
B. SEC Enforcemnt 
From a public-enforcement standpoint, the result of this 
decision may be more serious. If, as the dissent suggested, 
Central Bank applies to SEC actions as well as private ac- 
tions,'" the SEC is likewise left to other means to  establish 
secondary liability, or else it must, as it has recently done, 
simply let go of alleged aiders and abettors.ls5 This erosion of 
enforceability leads to  a "bizarre" result:'86 "The commission 
can revoke a broker's license for aiding and abetting a Rule 
lob-5 violation, but it cannot obtain an injunction against the 
broker for the same conduct."'" Additionally, many aiders 
and abettors previously charged and sanctioned will likely 
move for removal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
60(b)(6), which allows relief "from a final judgment, order, or 
183. See Mathews & Callcott, supra note 179, at 1761. These authors assert, 
however, that early legislation is unlikely in light of pressing legislative concerns, 
such as welfare, crime, and health reform. Id. 
184. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1460 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
185. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. In 1992, 15% of the SEC's 
civil enforcement proceedings were aiding and abetting claims. In an amicus brief, 
the SEC stated that to eliminate this "liability would 'sharply diminish the effec- 
tiveness of Commission actions.'" Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1460 n.11 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus 
Curiae at 18 n.15, Central Bank (No. 92-854)). 
186. Mathews & Callcott, supra note 179, at 1759. Consider the majority's own 
statement in Central Bank: "Policy considerations cannot override our interpretation 
of the text and structure of the Act, except to the extent that they may help to 
show that adherence to the text and structure would lead to a result 'so bizarre' 
that Congress could not have intended it. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1453-54 
(quoting Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 191 (1991)) (emphasis added). 
187. Mathews & Callcott, supra note 179, at 1759. 
[The commission] can obtain a civil money penalty against that broker in 
an administrative proceeding, but it cannot seek a civil penalty against 
him in federal court. It may (arguably) be able to impose liability . . . for 
aiding and abetting in cases of insider trading, where it rarely needs such 
a theory, but it cannot use this theory in cases involving fraudulent fi- 
nancial statements, manipulation, or penny-stock fraud, where secondary 
liability has been crucial to its enforcement program. 
Id. at 1759, 1761 [The text cited is scattered over two pages in the original due to 
an apparent publication error; I have indicated the break with the ellipses]. The 
dissent in Cenhl  Bank also assumed that this decision encompasses SEC actions: 
"The majority leaves little doubt that the [I9341 Act does not even permit the 
Commission to pursue aiders and abettors in civil enforcement actions under 
8 10(b) and Rule lob-5." Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1460 (Stevens, J. dissenting) 
(internal reference omitted). 
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proceeding for. . . any other reason justifying relief fkom the 
operation of the judgment."188 
If Central Bank does not extend to SEC actions, as SEC 
General Counsel Simon M. Lome argues,18' the agency is still 
left with a heavy enforcement burden.lgO As the Commission 
has asserted in the past, it has neither the human resources 
nor the financial capital sufficient to  bring aiding and abetting 
suits arising from all nonfrivolous complaints received.lgl 
Hence, regardless of whether Central Bank extends to SEC 
civil enforcement, the agency now faces increased enforcement 
challenges that may be remedied only by additional legisla- 
tion.lg2 Because of the Court's plain language approach, any 
188. FED. R. CIV. P. 60&)(6). For a brief discussion on this prediction, see 
Mathews & Callcott, supra note 179, at  1761 ("Surely an injunction . . . should not 
remain in place against conduct the 1934 Act does not . . . reach." (internal quota- 
tion marks omitted)). 
189. See Lome, supra note 179, at  1467 (arguing that a five-to-four decision 
can only be taken for the explicit holding pertaining to an implied private right of 
action against aiders and abettors). Lorne's article presents a "hypothetical opinion 
of some future Supreme Court" dealing with the issue. Id. The hypothetical hold- 
ing, finding that an SEC action against aiding and abetting a $ 1001) violation is 
maintainable, is based on "persuasive statutory authority and policy arguments." 
Id. at 1477. 
190. "Private rights of action have always served as a necessary supplement to  
the Commission's own enforcement program." Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 165, at 
293 (1990) (citing J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)). 
191. "[Gliven the limited enforcement resources of the Commission, the private 
right of action is vital to effective enforcement of Section lo@)." Grundfest, supra 
note 164, at 969 (quoting Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus 
Curiae In Support of Partial Affirmance at 6, Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 
459 U.S. 375 (1983) (Nos. 81-680 & 81-1076)). But see id. at 963, 969-71 (arguing 
several disadvantages of implied private rights of action and that the Commission 
has the authority to "disimply" them). 
192. To merely increase the SEC's budget would not be sufficient. The SEC 
needs investors to have a § lo@) private right of action against aiders and abet- 
tors available to them. See Securities Hearings, supra note 14, at 113 (Testimony 
of William R. McLucas, Director, Division of Enforcement, United States Securities 
and Exchange Comm.). But see Grundfest, supra note 164, at 969-71. Furthermore, 
[Tlhe SEC's position fiom the outset has been that Central Bank should 
be overturned by Congress. Speaking before the Senate's Securities Sub- 
committee during a special hearing concerning Central Bank, Chairman 
Levitt proclaimed that "[l]egislation expressly providing that the Commis- 
sion can seek injunctions and other relief against aiders and abettors is 
necessary . . . . Legislation to restore aiding and abetting liability in 
private action is also necessary in order to preserve the benefits of pri- 
vate actions as a source of deterrence." 
John F.X. Peloso & Stuart M. Sarnoff, What Now for Aider and Abettor Liability?, 
N.Y. L.J., June 16, 1994, at 7 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting 
Hearings Concerning the Central Bank of Denver Decision Before the Subcomm. on 
Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d 
300 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995 
resulting legislation will likely be hit and miss, since such 
statutes are now to  be construed strictly. As the SEC and legis- 
lators know, drafting a statute to  encompass the ingenuity of 
future peripheral defendants is very difficult. This is one rea- 
son why section 10(b) was drafted in such broad remedial 
terms: "Section lqb)  of the [I9341 Act was designed as a 
'catchall' anti-fraud provision t o  enable the [SEC] to handle 
novel and unforeseen types of securities fraud . . . ."lg3 In ef- 
fect, the High Court's plain language approach in Central Bank 
has stifled the broad remedial scheme that section 1qb) was 
designed t o  provide. 
C. Future of the Implied Private Right Under Section lo@) 
The Central Bank ruling suggests an analytical inconsis- 
tency: Although a private cause of action against aiding and 
abetting is not sustainable under section lqb)  because the 
statute does not expressly mention aiding and abetting, a pri- 
vate cause of action against a primary section 10(b) defrauder 
is sustainable even though a private right of action is not ex- 
pressly mentioned. If the Court is to be consistent, it must 
"disi~nply~~ the section lqb)  private right of action. However, 
the Court is unlikely to do so since precedent supporting the 
implied private right is entrenched even deeper than that sup- 
porting an aiding and abetting action under section 10(b).lN 
One commentator discusses a potential threat to the im- 
plied 1qb) cause of action arising from another source: the 
Commission itself. Professor Joseph A. Grundfest's article, 
Disimplying Private Rights of Actwn Under the Federal Securi- 
ties Laws: The Commisswn's Authority,lg5 argues, inter alia, 
that implying private rights has created many adverse ef- 
fects'% and that the SEC has the authority to  "disimply" 
Cong., 2d Sess. FDCH Congressional Testimony at 4, May 12, 1994, avaihble in 
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current News file (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman of 
the SEC)). 
193. Securities Hearings, supra note 14, at 124 (Prepared Statement of Mark 
J. Griffin, Securities Division, Department of Commerce, Salt Lake City, UT). 
194. For a discussion on the strength of the implied private right, see Pitt & 
Shapiro, supra note 165, at 182-83, 293-94 (predicting that implied private rights 
of action will increase between 1990 and 2000). 
195. Grundfest, supra note 164. 
196. Among the criticisms of the implied private right of action are that it is 
a mechanism for investors to bling ikivolous civil suits, and that it is a high-stakes 
gamble that can result in a class action windfall. See id. at 969-71. See generally 
RICHARD A. PoSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 224-25, 236-39 (4th ed. 1992) 
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theme1'' His article is an indication of the current trend 
among scholars and in recent case law to narrow the federal 
securities laws.1g8 If the private right can be administratively 
"disimplied," as Professor Grundfest asserts, its stability comes 
into que~tion.'~' 
Notwithstanding the Court's present tenor of strictly con- 
struing securities statutes,zoO the implied private right is 
probably secure. Even if the Court or the SEC were to 
"disimply" it, Congress would likely create a n  express private 
right of action under section 10(b). Congress often reacts to 
judicial and administrative uprootings that incite contrary 
public opinion.201 The private right has probably become too 
entrenched to simply be swept away without creating signifi- 
cant public and administrative unrest. 
The Court's plain language approach stifles the broad re- 
medial purpose of section 10(b). The Supreme Court's message 
in Central Bank seems to be that Congress must legislate with 
great specificity-broad references to deterring fraud in  the 
securities markets will not suffice. However, the Court strug- 
gled to justify its conclusions in light of the lower federal court 
precedent, historical context, and policy that support a private 
action against aiding and abetting. The Court's employment of 
a plain language analysis is an effective means of avoiding 
judicial overreaching in  statutory interpretation in many con- 
(discussing overdeterrence and its implications). 
197. See Grundfest, supra note 164, at 976-99. 
198. For a discussion of this trend, see Alan R. Bromberg, Aiding and Abet- 
ting: Sudden Death and Possible Resurrection, 27 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 
133 (1994); and see also Mathews & Callcott, supra note 179, at 1761-63 (suggest- 
ing a "return of a trendn toward "narrowing . . . the federal securities lawsn). 
199. But cf. Peloso & Sarnoff, supra note 192, at 7 (quoting as the SEC's 
position, "Legislation to restore aiding and abetting liability in private action is 
. . . necessary in order to preserve the benefits of private actions as a source of 
deterrence .") . 
200. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text. 
201. For example, Congress limited the retroactive effect of Lampf, Pleva, 
Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991), which adopted a 
short statute of limitations for private Rule lob-5 actions. See G.D. v. 
Westmoreland Sch. Dist., 783 F. Supp. 1532 (D.N.H. 1992) (noting the abrogation). 
The Supreme Court will decide whether this congressional action violates the sepa- 
ration of powers in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., l F.3d 1487 (6th Cir. 1993), 
cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 2161 (June 6, 1994) (No. 93-1121) (The Court heard oral 
arguments on November 30, 1994.). 
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texts. Nevertheless, it would seem that, when Congress uses 
broad legislative construction and clearly sets forth its far- 
reaching intent, the judiciary should feel free to interpret the 
statutory language accordingly. Central Bank, however, demon- 
strates the modem Court's unwillingness to do so with regard 
to civil aiding and abetting liability under section 1003). 
Furthermore, the ruling is analytically inconsistent with 
the implied private right of action under section 10(b), since the 
plain language of the statute does not create a private right of 
action. However, the implied section 10(b) private right is prob- 
ably not in danger of extinction, since it has been deeply en- 
trenched by decades of precedent. Even if the Court or the SEC 
were to "disimply" it, Congress would likely legislate an ex- 
press private right of action against section 10(b) violators to 
effectuate the remedial intent underlying the 1934 Act. 
T. James Lee, Jr. 
